Title: A Model of Enclosures: Coordination, Conflict, and Efficiency in the Transformation of Land Property Rights

Abstract: We study a simple general equilibrium model of the transformation of customary, informal property rights to land into exclusive ownership. We characterize the transformation in property rights – the enclosure process – as an aggregative game with potential spillovers and coordination failures. Population density, possibilities for technological improvement, and the costs of establishing property rights, shape equilibrium outcomes. None, some, or all land in a region may become enclosed in equilibrium, with differing consequences for output, wages, and land rents. For some parameter values, the model admits multiple equilibria, implying indeterminacy of the property rights regime. We analyze these cases using tools from the Global Games literature and find that both atomistic and centralized enclosure processes may lead to efficient transformation, but may also lead to inefficient failures to transform, or excessive enclosure in the form of property rights races and land grabs.